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NEW YORK REGULATION OF CONDOMINIUMS
Purchasers of condominium units often assume that state and
federal agencies will protect them from unscrupulous practices by
developers, only to later learn that the mere inclusion of a particular
term in a "thick booklet of fine legal print" satisfies all of the regulatory
requirements.' These misconceptions occur despite painstaking efforts
to inform buyers of the limited role of state authorities.2
1 N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1974, § 1, at I, col. 4.
In response to a comment made by Assistant Attorney General David Clurman in
defense of the New York scheme of condominium regulation, one unit owner wrote:
The rights of unit owners, which Mr. Clurman asserts are protected by the
condominium act and the blue sky laws, do not, for all practical purposes, exist.
The buyer of a condominium unit or any other form of joint ownership in land
should be aware that the attorney general's office is unable to assist any buyer
in enforcing the rights which the documents registered with the attorney general
grant him....
I am disgusted with Mr. Clurman for asserting that by requiring full disclo-
sure the attorney general's office insures and protects the rights of unit owners.
Letter to the Editor from Mrs. Ernest Gans, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1972, § 8, at 10, col. 4.
The author of the letter had complained that the developer refused to hold the first
annual meeting and that the building was not administered by a duly elected board of
managers. Id. It is interesting to note that an individual with the same name and
residing in the same locale was a defendant in an action by the board of managers to
recover for delinquent charges some five months earlier. See Board of Managers v. Gans,
72 Misc. 2d 726, 340 N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972). Mr. Clurman had previously
contrasted state regulation of condominiums with that of homeowners' associations. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 5, 1972, § 8, at 10, col. 1.
Countering the unit owner's attack, Mr. Clurman drew an analogy to the publicly
held corporation where stock issues are heavily regulated, but the rights of the individual
shareholders must be privately enforced. Letter to the Editor from David Clurman,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1972, § 8, at 8, col. 6. Mr. Clurman did not contradict Mrs. Gans'
conclusions:
The law requires full disclosure of the details of the offerings but they do not
suggest that the attorney general's office or any other agency govern the internal
operation of condominiums or homeowners' associations once they are formed.
Once an organization is formed the participants themselves, as owners, are
responsible for self-government. . . .
Id.
In contrast to the complaints of Mrs. Gans, another unit owner had more favorable
words for the Attorney General's office:
I will not linger over the problems common to all buyers of new homes except
to say that we, too, had punch-list items that were never corrected. And our roofs
leaked. Only after the Attorney General's office stepped in were we able to
collect from our builder to pay for decent roofing.
Sanders, Condominium Life Can Present Unexpected Challenges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1970,
§ 8, at 34, col. 1.
2 The outside cover of the offering plan must contain the following statement in 10
point type:
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK DOES NOT PASS
ON THE MERITS OF THIS OFFERING.
13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.2(a)(1) (1964). No other reference to the Attorney General or the Depart-
ment of Law is permitted. Likewise, all literature and advertising in connection with
the offer must contain a similar disclaimer. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(4) (McKinney
1968).
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While the primary thrust of New York regulation exists in its
stiff disclosure requirements, critics may have overstated their case.
Considerable discretion does lie with the Attorney General to reject
offering plans and to police fraudulent practices. New York's "blue
sky" law, the Martin Act,3 is among the most extensive in the nation.4
Additional substantive protection is afforded the unit owner by the
state's Condominium Act.5
Should he avail himself of the opportunity, the prospective unit
buyer may acquire a wealth of information concerning the particulars
of a given project. With the assistance of counsel versed in the pitfalls
of unit buying, the individual can make a well informed judgment on
the initial decision to purchase.6 From the developer's perspective, his
counsel must be thoroughly informed on all options available under
local law. Considerable time and expense will be necessary in meet-
ing the nuts and bolts disclosure requirements.
This note seeks to survey New York law governing the develop-
ment, sale and ownership of the condominium and its units.
MARKET TESTING
Unlike the regulatory scheme adopted by many states, New York
places the sale of condominium units under the provisions of its securi-
ties law.8 Thus, the Bureau of Securities and Public Financing of the
Department of Law (the Bureau) has a ready-made source of regulatory
authority under the Martin Act. Its provisions apply equally to prop-
erty located within and without the state, provided it is offered for sale
in New York.9
3 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 et seq. (McKinney 1968) (also referred to as Article 23-A).
4 See 1 CONDOMINIUht RP., Oct. 1973, at 4, wherein the New York and California
registration systems are referred to as being of the "regulation" variety as distinguished
from the schemes used in "disclosure" states. A contrary view was expressed by an As-
sistant Attorney General. Remarks of Hon. Arthur S. Levine, Condominium Workshop,
Oct. 26, 1973, reproduced at p. 688 supra [hereinafter cited as Levine].
5 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-d et seq. (McKinney 1968).
6For a discussion of the role of the buyer's attorney see Rohan, Condominium
Housing: A Purchaser's Perspective, 17 STAN. L. REv. 842 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Purchaser's Perspective].
7 See, e.g., notes 8-19 (market test) & 33-34 (prefiling conference).and accompanying
text infra.
8 N.Y. REA. PROP. LAw § 339-ee(l) (McKinney 1968) provides that for the purposes
of N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-e (McKinney 1968), a condominium is deemed a cooperative
interest in realty.
9 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-e(1)(a) (McKinney 1968) makes it illegal "to make or take
part in a public offering or sale in or from the state of New York" of real estate syndica-
tion offerings. There is surprisingly little litigation on the application of the Martin Act
to sales of out of state securities within New York. This may be due in part to the strict
criminal penalties for noncompliance. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-c (McKinney 1968).
Nevertheless, the Attorney General has reported:
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Attorney General's office has provided a limited exemption
from the rigorous filing requirements in the case of a developer who
merely seeks to gauge the availability of a market for unit sales in a
given area. Upon application, permission may be granted to the sponsor
to solicit nonbinding reservations of up to fifty dollars for a period
of twenty-one days.' 0 The period will be extended only upon a showing
that the initial period was inadequate." All advertising material must
be submitted for approval and must contain specified disclaimers. 12
If an offering plan is eventually filed, the sponsor must inform the
depositor, giving him an option to purchase within fifteen days.
3
There are few limitations on the purposes for which the market
test may be used.' 4 It may be employed in conjunction with new con-
struction as well as conversions. The test may effectively be used in
deciding whether to proceed with a proposed project, or in determining
the number, style and price of the units.15 Furthermore, it may be in-
fluential in attracting institutional lenders. An initial check should be
made with prospective lenders to determine their views on the timing
of the market test. They may require certain supervision to insure the
validity of the test as a barometer of the potential success of the project.
If financing arrangements have already been made, the market test
may be a means of taking advantage of a particularly bright selling
season while the offering plan is still being drafted.
A separate procedure has been devised by the Bureau for tenants
seeking to explore the possibility of converting their apartment build-
ing to either a condominium or a cooperative. 16 Solicitations of up to
two hundred and fifty dollars from co-tenants may be made for the
purposes of retaining counsel, conducting engineering studies and
Despite public awareness of the requirement to file offering plans for condo-
minium offerings being made in the State of New York, a number of out of
state condominium sponsors have attempted to evade this requirement. Investi-
gations made of these and other violations of Article 23-A of the GBL resulted in
the Cooperative and Condominium section obtaining approximately $125,000 in
costs under Section 63 subdivision 15 of the Executive Law.
1972 N.Y. AT-'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 20.
10 Cooperative Policy Statement No. I (also applicable to condominiums) [hereinafter
cited as CPS-1]. A complete set of forms and statements applicable to the condominium
are available by writing to the Department of Law, Bureau of Securities and Public
Financing, 2 World Trade Center, New York, N.Y. 10047.
11 Id. at 5, n.B.
12 Id. at 1, § 5. See also Suggested CPS-1 Advertising Guidelines.
13 CPS-l at 3, § 7.
14 The prospective sponsor must have an interest of some kind in the property. Levine,
supra note 4, at p. 697.
15 Levine, supra note 4, at p. 690.
16 Cooperative Policy Statement No. 3 (also applicable to condominiums) (available
at the Bureau of Securities and Public Financing, 2 World Trade Center, New York,
N.Y. 10047).
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exploring possibilities of financing.17 Contributing tenants are entitled
to the return of any unspent balance. Representations must be made by
the tenants who promote the conversion that the landlord has not in
any way solicited their efforts.' 8 The Attorney General reports that the
introduction of this procedure has reduced the number of complaints
of harassment by fellow residents wishing to convert.' 9
THE OFFERING PLAN
From the developer's point of view, the most troublesome aspect
of the Martin Act is the requirement of filing an offering plan or
prospectus. To insure that the proper information is disclosed, exten-
sive and detailed regulations have been promulgated governing the
content of the offering plan. No fewer than 44 separate items of dis-
closure, many with their own subsections, are required to be included
in the plan. In addition, some 33 documents and 21 exhibits must also
be filed.2 0
There is statutory authority for discretionary filing exemptions
when the offering is made to a group of less than forty, or has been
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or
exempted by the SEC for reasons other than its being an intrastate offer-
ing.21 While the Bureau has not yet indicated to what extent that dis-
cretion will be exercised, a recently proposed policy statement would
exempt from filing an offering which fully complies with the new
SEC Rule 146.22 Separate and apart from a possible SEC-based exemp-
tion, the regulations provide that in the case of a wholly nonresidential
condominium, the filing of a declaration of submission to the Condo-
minium Act and bylaws may be sufficient.23
Counsel for the sponsor who is registering property within the
state will find that there is great interplay between the substantive
provisions of the Condominium Act and the regulations governing the
17 Id. The policy statement sets forth specific guidelines as to how the collected monies
should be handled and the type of information to be disclosed to contributing tenants.
18Id. By the same token, a landlord's consent form must be obtained before the
solicitation will be permitted.
19 1972 N.Y. ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 19.
20 13 N.Y.C.R.R. § 19.1 et seq. (1964). See Instructions for Submission of Documents
on Review of a Proposed Offering Plan (1973) (available at the Bureau of Securities and
Public Financing, 2 World Trade Center, New York, N.Y. 10047).
21 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-g (McKinney 1968).
22 See Proposed Policy Statement No. 100 (Nov. 12, 1974). SEC Rule 146 was adopted
in Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974) and is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.146
(1974). For a discussion of the application of Rule 146 to condominium projects subject
to federal securities law, see Erwin, Marketing Investment Condominiums and Real Estate
Syndications Without Securities Registration: SEC Rule 146, 3 RFAL ESrAT L.J. 119
(1974).
23 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.2(b)(xliii) (1964).
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offering plan. This may be used effectively to minimize some of the
work involved. For example, many of the specific rights and duties of
the sponsor, the board of managers, the unit owners and third parties,
which must be disclosed in the offering plan, are spelled out in detail
in the Condominium Act itself.2 4 For registration of properties located
in other states, the New York act may serve as a convenient guide in
drafting provisions which are to be included in the offering plan but
are not covered by local legislation. It will ,be most helpful in the
drafting process to examine offering plans which have already been
accepted for filing.
As required by both the offering plan regulations and the Condo-
minium Act, the sponsor's counsel will draft bylaws and house rules
for the project2 5 He should keep in mind that these provisions will
24 For example, 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.2(b)(iii) (1964) inquires as to "[w]hether each con-
dominium interest is to be separately assessed for real estate taxes, and the effect upon
an owner of such interest of the nonpayment of real estate taxes by any other such owner."
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-y (McKinney 1968) outlines the method of separate taxation.
The chart below may be useful in cross referencing the sections.
Disclosure requirement of 13 N.Y.C.R.R. Relevant Section of N.Y. REAL PROP.
19.2(b) (1964) LAw (McKinney 1968)
(i) 339-d et seq.
(ii) 339-e(3)(5), 339-g
(iii) 339-y
(iv)(a) 339-1, 339-ff
(iv)(b) 339-ff
(v) 339-v(2)(a)
(vi) 339-s
(vii) 339-e
(xi) 339-h, 339-g, 339-i(l)(4), 339-n, 339-t,
339-cc, 339-i(l), 339-m
(xii) 339-i(l), 339-m
(xiii) 339-j
(xiv) 339-1
(xv) 339-z, 339-aa
(xvii) 339-j
(xviii) 339-x
(xix) 339-bb
(xxii)(b) 339-1
(xxii)(d) 339-v(i)(b)
(xxii)(g) 339-v(h)(i)
(xxii)(h) 339-w
(xxii)(j) 339-e(8), 339-v(i)(b)(j)
(xxii)(l) 339-t
(xxii)(n) 339-i(5)
(xxii)(o) 339-cc
(xxii)(p) 339-dd
25 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.2(b)(xxiii) (1964) provides that in lieu of certain disclosure items,
the sponsor may submit the bylaws, provided they contain the same information. N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 339-u (McKinney 1968) requires that the bylaws be recorded with
the declaration of submission to the Act.
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govern the condominium long after the client's interest has ended.
Furthermore, saddling the condominium with a system of unworkable
regulations may well affect the saleability of the units. On the other
hand, the discriminating purchaser will no doubt desire some protec-
tion from his yet unseen neighbors. Assistance from the developer and
his marketing experts will be helpful in this regard.
In new constructions, the project's architect will be able to provide
most of the required technical data concerning structure, design, ma-
terials, storage space, plumbing and the like.2 6 An engineering survey
and a real estate appraisal may be necessary in the case of a conversion.27
The aid of an independent public accountant will be required in
order to prepare a profit and loss statement for existing buildings reflect-
ing the operating figures for at least the past two years.28 A projection
of income and expenditures for the condominium, together with esti-
mates of the common charges, must be submitted. While the developer
must outline the cost, percentage of appurtenant interest, and expenses
for each particular unit, he may alter the selling price of a unit sub-
sequent to filing, provided the proper caveat is given in advance.29
A broker-dealer license must be obtained by the sponsor, his
selling agent and any salesmen to be employed.30 Inquiry into the
individual's prior employment and criminal records are made at the
time of application. 31 Case law indicates that this requirement does not
apply to a real estate broker who is engaged in the resale of a unit.32
When all the necessary data have been compiled and the offering
plan is near completion, the sponsor may avail himself of the optional
prefiling procedure. 33 After submitting the proposed offering plan
and advertising material to the Bureau, a conference will be arranged
at which any possible deficiencies and potential trouble spots may be
worked out. The time from initial submission to formal acceptance for
filing may take anywhere from fifteen days to two months, depending
upon the type of project and its complexities. 34
26 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.2(b)(viii)(c) (1964).
27Id. 19.2(xi); 19.3(b)(14).
281Id. 19.2(b)(xxvi).
29 Id. 19.2(v)(ix)(xxxiv). The front cover must contain a warning statement in bold
type. Id. 19.2(a)(4).
30 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-e (McKinney 1968). Form M-10, available from the
Bureau, will satisfy this requirement. The practitioner should note that a number of
exemptions from this requirement are set forth in N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 339-f (McKinney
1968).
31 Id. § 359-e(3)(b).
32 See Maxine Gerard, Inc. v. Fisher, 64 Misc. 2d 291, 314 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970).
33 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.3 (1964).
34 A recent legislative enactment extends the time period for processing offering
1974]
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AUTHORITY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Bureau is careful to note that the Attorney General does not
pass upon the merits of an offering plan but merely accepts it for filing.
35
The statute on its face provides rather narrow grounds for refusing to
file an offering plan: either a deficiency in the information to be dis-
closed or the failure to "clearly set forth the specific property . .. to
be acquired .... -36 Additional standards may be found among those
provisions of the Martin Act describing certain fraudulent practices
subject to criminal sanction.37
Despite this seemingly limited basis for judging the prospectus, a
good deal of discretion appears to be exercised by the Attorney General
in reviewing the substantive aspects of a plan. To date, no challenge
has been made to this arguably unfounded use of discretion. To some
extent, the absence of a challenge may be attributed to the narrow
standard of judicial review open to an individual who seeks a nulli-
fication of the Attorney General's decision to accept or reject the pro-
ferred plan for filing. Such decisions of the Attorney General are
reviewable in the courts only by way of an Article 78 proceeding,3 a
special proceeding governed by a four-month statute of limitations.39
In the leading case of Schumann v. 250 Tenants Corp.,40 it was held
plans from fifteen days to sixty days. N.Y. SEss. LAWS [1974], ch. 1021, § 1 (McKinney),
amending N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2) (McKinney 1968).
Under the prior law, there were indications of judicial displeasure over delays by
the Attorney General. The court, in In re 160 West 87th St. Corp. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
in 170 N.Y.L.J. 30, Aug. 13, 1973, at 2, col. 2, granted relief when the Attorney General
had not accepted for filing the offering plan for a conversion after three months. The
Attorney General was ordered to either file the plan within ten days or determine that
the plan contains an "untrue statement of material fact." See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§ 352-3(b) (McKinney 1968).
35 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
36 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2) (McKinney 1968).
37 Id. § 352-c. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text infra.
38 An Article 78 proceeding, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1968), is
a vehicle for private challenges to administrative action. Section 7801 provides, in part,
that "[r]elief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review, mandamus or prohibition
shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article."
39 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 217 (McKinney 1972). The statute runs from the time the
determination is made. In Tuvim v. 10 E. 30 Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 541, 300 N.E.2d 397, 347
N.Y.S.2d 13 (1973), the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's attempt to seek
review of the Attorney General's acceptance of a conversion plan on the ground that
the complaint was time barred. The court held, inter alia, that "an amendment to the
plan filed some months after its original acceptance, did not extend the time to challenge
that acceptance .. " Id. at 545 n.2, 300 N.E.2d at 398 n.2, 347 N.Y.S.2d 14 n.2. See In re
1625 Tenants Ass'n (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 170 N.Y.L.J. 78, Oct. 23, 1973, at 2, col. 3.
But see Grenader v. Lefkowitz, 71 Misc. 2d 414, 336 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1972) (amendment was of such a nature as to extend the statute of limitations).
40 65 Misc. 2d 253, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), cited with approval
in In re Greenthal & Co., 32 N.Y.2d 457, 299 N.E.2d 657, 346 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1973). In
Schumann, tenants had alleged that the landlord used fraudulent means in obtaining
the requisite 35% tenant approval for conversion of the building to cooperative status.
[Vol. 48:964
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that the standard by which the Attorney General's decision to file a
plan is to be judged is "whether his actions were arbitrary and capri-
cious or based upon some rational and reasonable ground."41 Under
this standard, a sponsor might find it difficult to convince a court that
the Attorney General's rejection of a plan was without any basis in
reason.
Ironically, the discretionary standard has proven, at times, to
benefit the sponsor. Thus far, most of the litigation in this area has
arisen when tenants in existing buildings have sought to nullify the
acceptance for filing of an offering plan for conversion to cooperative
or condominium status.42 To soften the impact of the rule on tenants,
courts have relied upon their inherent equitable powers to deal with
fraud.43
If the sponsor has taken advantage of, the prefiling conference
procedure, he will become aware, at an early stage, of those aspects of
the plan to which there are strong objections from the Attorney Gen-
eral's office. If attempts to iron out the difficulties are unsuccessful, the
sponsor's dilemma wisd be whether to fly in the face of a possible rejec-
tion and hope for success based upon the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, or else eliminate the purportedly objectionable features of
the plan. Apparently, the Bureau has created this Hobson's choice as
a means of discouraging developer practices which the Bureau deems
harsh and inequitable to the prospective unit owner.44
A recurrent complaint of unit owners across the nation is the
practice of developers entering into long-term recreational leases and
41 65 Misc. 2d at 257, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
42 See Tuvim v. 10 E. 30 Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 541, 300 N.E.2d 397, 347 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1973);
Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 300 N.E.2d 388, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973); In re Greenthal
& Co., 32 N.Y.2d 457, 299 N.E.2d 657, 346 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1973). See also Whalen v.
Lefkowitz (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1973), 170 N.Y.L.J. 3, Sept. 18, 1973, at 19, col. 4,
rev'd sub nom., Parkchester Apart. v. Lefkowitz, 44 App. Div. 2d 442, 355 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1st Dep't 1974). Grenader v. Lefkowitz, 71 Misc. 2d 414, 336 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1972). For a thorough discussion of the entire problem of tenant conversions,
see Note, Tenant Protection in Condominium Conversions, supra at p. 688.
43 Schumann v. 250 Tenants Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253, 258, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500, 505 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1970). In Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 300 N.E.2d 388, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1973), the Court of Appeals permitted a class action by a group of tenants who alleged
that false representations had been made in soliciting purchasers in a cooperative con-
version.
44 One of the major vices of the present regulatory system is absence of standards to
which the practitioner may refer. Assistant Attorney General Levine notes that New York
does not have a provision for review of the "fairness" of an offering plan, yet he mentions
a number of practices which will not be tolerated notwithstanding full disclosure. Levine,
supra note 4, at p. 688. For this reason, it is suggested that New York authorize the
Attorney General or an independent regulatory body to draft substantive regulations
governing the sale and ownership of the condominium unit. See note 82 and accompanying
text infra.
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"sweetheart" management contracts. 45 In the typical case, the sponsor,
while in control of a majority of units, enters into a 99-year lease with
his hand-picked board of managers for the use and maintenance of the
swimming pool, tennis courts and other recreational areas.46 The unit
owners as lessees eventually pay many times over the true cost of these
facilities, while the developer has a handsome source of continuing
income. Similarly, long-term management contracts are often negotiated
with sponsor-affiliated companies. 47 Certainly, a developer's continuing
hold on the condominium by means of long-term contracts is inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the Condominium Act, viz., that the condomin-
ium be controlled by its unit owners. The Attorney General's office
has responded to these practices by taking a dim view towards the
filing of offering plans for New York projects containing management
contracts in excess of three years or any form of recreational lease .4  A
more lenient view is taken in regard to projects located in other states.
The Attorney General's role in regulating condominiums is by
no means related solely to the filing of offering plans. The Martin Act
provides him with ample authority to curb so-called fraudulent prac-
tices. 49 Persons may be criminally prosecuted for false representations,
whether made in the offering plan or elsewhere, when the person
(i) knew the truth; or (ii) with reasonable effort could have known
45 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 4. For a discussion of how a developer
may increase his profits under a management contract which is not inequitable see 1
CONDOMINIUM REP., Mar. 1973, at 3.
46 In one case, the sponsor drafted an offering plan in which all the recreational
facilities comprise one "unit." The recreational unit, consisting of a swimming pool.
shuffleboard courts, sauna baths, an auditorium, billiard room, exercise room, and
miscellaneous facilities was rented to the owner's association under a 99-year lease at
$115,000 per year with an escalator clause. By declaring the common elements a con-
dominium unit, he was able to maintain a voting interest in the condominium. Of-
fering Plan, Winston Towers 200 Condominium (Miami Beach, Florida, Oct. 15, 1971).
47 A four year contract with an automatic renewal clause in favor of a management
corporation owned by the sponsor's parent company was contained in the Offering Plan
for Quadomain Towers I and IV Condominium Apartments (Hollywood, Florida, Oct. 1,
1973). Another Florida offering contained an eight year management contract. See Offering
Plan, Hillcrest No. 23 Condominium (Hollywood, Florida, June 15, 1972).
48 1 CONDOMINIuM REP., Mar., 1973, at 6-7.
49 The Martin Act, throughout its provisions, declares certain activities to be fraudu-
lent practices. Among them are:
devices, schemes, artifices, fictitious or pretended purchases or sales of securities
or commodities, deceptions, misrepresentations, concealments, suppressions, frauds,
false pretenses, false promises, practices, transactions and courses of business. ...
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352(1) (McKinney 1968). The statutory language gives the Attorney
General broad discretion to determine whether to challenge any practice. Unlike his
administrative discretion in accepting or rejecting an offering plan, see text accompanying
notes 41-42 supra, the Attorney General's executive discretion in proceeding against a
party is not reviewable by the courts. See People v. Bunge Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 91, 250
N.E.2d 204, 302 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1969). Cf. Schumann v. 250 Tenants Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253,
317 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
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the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to ascertain the truth;
or (iv) did not have knowledge concerning the representation or
statement made.50
Criminal sanctions are also imposed for fraud, concealment, and sup-
pression, as well as representations "beyond reasonable expectation." 51
The Act also authorizes the Attorney General to conduct formal in-
vestigations, with full subpoena power, of any fraudulent practices
which are brought to his attention.52 He may seek the issuance of an
injunction against those engaged in the activity, and the appointment
of a receiver of any property obtained through the unauthorized
means.
53
THE CONDOMINIUM Acr
Just as the Martin Act is intended to protect the prospective
purchaser from fraudulent practices on the part of the selling sponsor,
the Condominium Act 54 attempts to protect the unit owner's rights
after title has passed. While the blue sky provisions place emphasis on
disclosure and public enforcement, the Condominium Act places the
burden on the unit owner to assert his own rights through private suit.
The Condominium Act applies only to property submitted to its
provisions by the recording of a declaration.55
The permanent character of the unit owner's interest in the com-
mon elements is clearly established.56 That interest may be computed
based upon either the dollar value of the unit or the proportion of
floor space.57 A recent legislative enactment expands the method of
computation to include a system whereby units within a single classifica-
tion may be allocated equal percentage interests.58 As an additional al-
ternative, the new law permits allocation based upon floor space,
subject to such factors as the relative value of the location, its unique-
ness, accessibility to common elements, and overall dimensions. 9 The
50 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c (McKinney 1968).
51 Id.
52 Id. § 352.
53 1d. § 353-a.
54 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-d et seq. (McKinney 1968).
55 Id. § 339-f. Among the items to be contained in the declaration are a description
of the land, the buildings, the common elements, the designation of each unit, and the
uses of the property. Id. § 339-n. For a discussion of condominiums without statutory
basis, see Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. Rv.
987, 1001 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
50 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-i(2) (McKinney 1968).
57 Id. § 339-i(1).
58 N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974], ch. 1056, § 2 (McKinney).
59 Id.
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new law takes a more realistic approach to allocating the common
charges and eliminates absolute reliance on rigid formulae.
The limitations on the unit owner imposed by statute are relatively
few. Strict compliance with the bylaws and house rules is a statutory
mandate, the violation of which gives rise to an action for damages
or injunctive relief.60 The right to a partition of the common elements
is expressly prohibited and provisions to the contrary are void. 61 The
unit owner may not perform any work which might threaten the safety
or impair the value of another's property.6 2 Second mortgages also are
greatly limited. 63
Several contingencies are given express recognition. If three-fourths
or more of the building is destroyed, and 75 percent of the owners do
not proceed to rebuild, an action to partition will lie with the proceeds
of the sale and insurance divided according to each individual's com-
mon interest.64 A provision in the declaration covering distribution of
condemnation awards is contemplated but not required.6 5 Eighty per-
cent of the unit owners, or such number as specified in the bylaws
may, at any time and without cause, withdraw the property from the
Condominium Act, in which case it is subject to an action for a parti-
tion.66
The statute provides for a board of managers to be elected by the
unit owners, but details as to the board's powers and duties are left to
the bylaws, which must be recorded with the declaration. 67 As a check
60 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j (McKinney 1968).
61 Id. § 339-i(3).
62 Id. § 339-k.
63 The prohibition does not run against the individual. Rather, it prohibits certain
types of lending institutions from investing in other than a first mortgage on a condo-
minium unit. Id. § 339-ff.
64 Id. § 339-cc. The New York solution to this troublesome problem recognizes that
in the usual situation insurance will have been obtained by the board of managers. Id.
§ 339-bb. Such an approach seems more realistic and practical than those employed in
other states. See Berger, supra note 55, at 1013.
65 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-i(2) (McKinney 1968). While such provisions are optional.
failure to provide for this contingency would probably be deemed a failure to "clearly set
forth the specific property . . . to be acquired ....... N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2)
(McKinney 1968). See note 36 and accompanying text supra. Absent a provision, the
proceeds would be distributed according to the common interest. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 339-m (McKinney 1968). Of course, if the individual's unit were the only subject of the
taking, the proceeds would be payable to him.
66 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-t (McKinney 1968).
67 Id. § 339-v. Well deserved criticism has been aimed at this provision for failing
to specify the organizational structure of the board. Purchaser's Perspective, supra note
6, at 858. Professor Rohan speculates that personal liability on the part of the unit
owner might arise for unauthorized activities of the board. This problem may be
partially alleviated by a recent amendment to N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v(l) (McKinney
1968), which expressly permits the board of managers to incorporate. N.Y. SEss. LAws
[1974], ch. 1056, § 6 (McKinney).
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against continual domination by one group, at least one-third of the
board must undergo annual election.6 The board is empowered to
bring actions on behalf of the unit owners and may obtain a lien
against an owner's unit for unpaid common charges.6 9 Profits and ex-
penses are distributed or charged according to the individual's frac-
tional common interest.70
Unfortunately, the Condominium Act does not directly address
itself to the activities of the project sponsor. Conceivably the sponsor
could retain control of the entire board of managers for at least as
long as a majority of the units remain unsold. While some sponsors,
as a gesture of good will, agree to vote for a certain number of unit
owner candidates, no such mandate exists.7 1 A requirement that one-
third of the board be comprised of unit owners other than the sponsor,
from the time of sale of one-third of the units and until such time as
a majority of units are sold, might eliminate much of the possible
overreaching by the sponsor. The sponsor's liability for the common
charges of the units that he holds should be explicitly stated.7 2
The potential developer of a project is limited by the Condomin-
ium Act in the type of condominium he may construct. The Act
contemplates a building or group of buildings, and there has been
speculation that a condominium without them would not be per-
mitted.73 Thus, problems might arise if the developer sought to con-
struct a marina condominium selling cubic feet of water space, where
no buildings as such would be part of the project. Until recently, lease-
hold condominiums were not permitted in New York. However, the
68 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v(1)(a) (McKinney 1968). Naturally, as long as the
sponsor retains a majority of the units, this provision will offer little comfort to the unit
owner.
69 Id. §§ 339-z, 339-dd. The action may be brought by the board on behalf of two or
more unit owners. Id. § 339-dd. See id. § 339-aa for methods of foreclosing a lien for com-
mon charges.
70 Id. § 339-m.
71Purchaser's Perspective, supra note 6, at 848. Not all sponsors are so generous.
One Florida offering plan, approved in New York, contained a provision giving the
sponsor the right to name the entire board of directors for as long as he owned a single
unit, or two years from the recording of the declaration, whichever came first. Offering
Plan, Hillcrest East No. 23 Condominium (Hollywood, Florida, June 15, 1972). The
preoccupation with control of the board of managers is partially due to the developer's
desire to keep the common charges to a minimum while he owns a large number of
units. See I CONDOMINuhs REP. No. 2, Mar. 1973, at 3.
7 2 Currently his liability can be predicated upon N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-m
(McKinney 1968), which provides that the common expenses are charged according to
ownership of the common interests. Furthermore, the Act prohibits a unit owner from
exempting himself from liability for the common charges by waiving his rights to use
the common elements. Id. § 339-x.
73 Purchaser's Perspective, supra note 6, at 847.
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Act has been amended to allow leasehold condominiums for exclusively
nonresidential purposes.7 4
The condominium is, of course, a form of real property and, as
such, is subject to various requirements of local law applicable to
realty.75 For example, compliance with zoning laws is required.76 An
informal opinion of the Attorney General indicates that the Multiple
Dwelling77 and Multiple Residence78 Laws apply to condominiums.79
However, Kaufman & Broad Homes v. Albertsons° indicates that the
usual requirement of filing a subdivision map is not a prerequisite to
the recording of the declaration."'
CONCLUSION
Ten years have elapsed since the passage of New York's Condomin-
ium Act.8 2 Thus far, New York has remained in the forefront of con-
sumer protection in the area of condominium sales. If it is to remain
so, it must adapt to the needs and problems of present and prospective
unit owners. Likewise, insensitivity to the difficulties of the developer
will stifle future growth in this mutually advantageous form of owner-
ship.
The current procedure for reviewing offering plans has the draw-
back of not delineating precise standards to guide the developer.
Management contracts for two years might not be opposed whereas
a three year contract might create a problem. Without the benefit of
regulatory standards governing the substantive aspects of a project,
the Bureau may at times take a "back door" approach to obtain mini-
mum protection for unit owners. Failure on the part of the developer
to comply with these unwritten standards of protection might result
in "finding something wrong" with the offering plan. Furthermore,
the current scheme provides only minimum protection for the unit
owner after the sponsor has left the scene. "In-fighting" among groups
74 N.Y. Sass. LAWS [1974], ch. 1056, § 1 (McKinney). The unexpired term of the lease
must be at least thirty years. Id.
75 The offering plan must contain a representation that there has been compliance
with all local zoning and construction laws. Furthermore, it must state whether a cer-
tificate of occupancy or certificate from the board of fire underwriters must be obtained.
13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.2(b)(xxi) (1964).
76 Id. The application of zoning laws to condominiums is discussed in Note, Condo-
miniums and Zoning, supra.
77 N.Y. MuLT. DwELL. LAw § I et seq. (McKinney 1974).
78 N.Y. MuLT. RasID. LAW § 1 et seq. (McKinney 1952) & (Supp. 1973).
79 1971 Op. ATr'y GEN. 58.
80 73 Misc. 2d 84, 341 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1972).
81 Id.
82 The Condominium Act took effect on March 2, 1964. Ch. 82, § 2, [1964] N.Y. Laws.
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of unit owners is a common phenomenon and disputes may turn into
costly and unnecessary court battles.8 3
The Legislature should grant authority to promulgate substantive
regulations governing the sale, management and control of condomin-
iums to either the Attorney General or to a specially created independent
regulatory body.84 Control by the Attorney General's office would
provide the benefit of expertise and economyin operation. An indepen-
dent body, however, offers greater input from both developers and con-
sumers and may be somewhat less susceptible to political pressure.
Through the much criticized reservation of power clause,85 regulations
could be applied to existing condominiums as well.
Provision for a regulatory authority with continuing jurisdiction
would provide greater responsiveness and flexibility than the current
statutory and case law approach. Perhaps some of the fears that cur-
rently exist on the part of tenants faced with the possibility of conver-
sion to condominium status might be partially abated by the knowledge
that their investment would be well protected. With the benefit of
ten years' experience, and the prospects for future expansion of con-
dominiums, now is an excellent time for the New York Legislature to
act.
P. Kevin Castel
83 See Board of Managers v. Gans, 72 Misc. 2d 726, 340 N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1972), wherein the board obtained judgment against the defendant unit owner for failure
to pay common charges. A dispute between the defendant and the board had erupted
over the change in the date of the board election. A more detailed discussion of the
controversy appears in a letter written by the defendant to the Editor of the N.Y. Times.
See note I supra. In Amoruso v. Board of Managers, 38 App. Div. 2d 845, 830 N.Y.S.2d
107 (2d Dep't 1972), a group of unit owners unsuccessfully sought to challenge a $500
expenditure by the board for a basketball court. See also Purchaser's Perspective, supra
note 6, at 855-56; Sanders, Condominium Life Can Present Unexpected Challenges, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 8, 1972, § 8, at 34, col. 1.
84 The concept of agency regulation of condominiums has been suggested by a num-
ber of sources. See Rohan, Second Generation Condominium Problems: Construction of
Enabling Legislation and Project Documents, VAL'ARAISO L. Rxv. 77, 91 (1966). The
author, however, points to existing New York regulation through the Attorney General's
office as a model. New York's Advisory Council on Condominium Development, consisting
of industry leaders, is cited as a major source of legislative proposals.
The Attorney General or the independent regulatory body should be given authority
to promulgate minimum standards for consumer protection. Failure to meet these stan-
dards would be grounds for rejecting an offering plan. Furthermore, a vehicle for arbi-
trating disputes between a board and unit owner should be established. See also AMENDED
REPORT OF THE FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM COMMISSION TO THE 1973 SESSION OF THE FLORIDA
STATE LrisLATuRE (1973); 1 CONDOMINiuM REP., June 1973, at 3.
85 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-hh (McKinney 1968). Concern was expressed that the
reservation of power clause might lead to the destruction of property rights. Memorandum
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, N.Y.S. LEGIs. ANN. 356 (1964).
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